278. See HUD REPORT, supra note 201. 279. One panelist who is a fee-for-service broker explains this as his "flat-fee plus" alternative, where, in addition to noting the home in the MLS and placing it on several sites, he supplies the seller assistance once the buyer is found. In addition to the flat fee cost of $495 paid sometimes of listing, the "flat-fee plus" choice needs the seller likewise to pay $1,500 at closing.
at 68 (explaining the alternative). 280. In an address at the beginning of the Workshop, (then Performing) Assistant Chief Law Officer Thomas Barnett observed that minimum-service laws and guidelines can be considered as no different from states passing a regulation that says: "When I walk into McDonald's and order a hamburger, I'm informed that I likewise need to purchase some french fries, since the state has chosen that it may be deceptive or misleading or bad if I just got the hamburger, spent for it and didn't understand I wasn't going to get the french fries." Barnett, Tr.
Likewise, at a recent Congressional hearing on competitors in the property brokerage market, Agent Baker analogized minimum-service laws and regulations to requiring a consumer to have his or her whole home painted when she or he just wanted the deck painted. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 30 (declaration of Rep.
Baker, member Home Comm. on Financial Solutions), available at http://frwebgate. access.gpo. gov/cgi-bin/getdoc. cgi?dbname= 109_house_hearings & docid= f:31541. pdf. 281. See Farmer, Tr. at 105 (keeping in mind that he contends versus standard "representatives out there that deal little or no worth to the deal."). 282. See Lewis, Tr. at 179 (" While some consumers might be sophisticated sufficient to represent themselves in some or all of the steps of a transaction, many are not.").
22, 2005, available at http://realtytimes. com/rtcpages/20050422 _ dojstepsin. htm (pricing quote Texas Association of Realtors claiming that minimum-service rules would prevent consumer confusion); Peter G. Baker, Employing a Broker: Should You Expect Less?, REALTY TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, available at http://realtytimes. com/rtcpages/20060411 _ hirebroker. htm (" [Federal government companies] argue that with disclosures and waivers consumers must be able to decline any brokerage service or obligation.
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We do not, for instance, permit consumers to conserve money by hiring medical professionals who cut expenses by not disinfecting surgical instruments or washing their hands."). 283. See Darryl W. Anderson, Minimum-Service Requirements in Real Estate Brokerage: An Action to Maureen K. Ohlhausen, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Jan. 2006, at 3-4 (arguing that minimum-service requirements are procompetitive because they cultivate cost settlements prior to getting in a representation arrangement over what a fee-for-service broker will charge for all the services needed by law).
See, e. g., GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 16. 285. Thorburn, Tr. at 96. 286. Farmer, Tr. at 73. 287. In addition, in action to an FTC survey, participants from Colorado, North Dakota, Vermont, and Washington kept in mind that grievances versus minimal service brokers were minimal or nonexistent. The survey is available at http://www.
htm. 288. Our evaluation of fee-for-service broker sites exposes that consumers appear to have prepared access to prices that fee-for-service brokers charge for additional services beyond the MLS-only choice in advance of participating in a legal relationship. This finding undermines an essential condition for the hold-up theory to be plausible that customers only discover the costs for additional services after they have gotten in into an unique listing agreement.
Ohlhausen, Minimum-Service Requirements in Property Brokerage: A Reply to Darryl Anderson, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Mar. 2006 (discussing numerous theoretical and empirical reasons that the hold-up theory does not appear to use to fee-for-service brokerage). 289. See Farmer, Tr - how to invest in real estate with no money. at 71-72. 290. Kunz, Tr. at 82-83. See also Perriello, Tr. at 152 (speaking for Cendant, and mentioning that "our company believe that consumers.
must have the ability to choose their service models along with the service provider of those services, whether they be restricted service or full-service"). 291. Sambrotto, Tr. how to get leads in real estate. at 116. 292. Farmer, Tr. at 72. 293. PATRICK WOODALL & STEPHEN BROBECK, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, HOW THE PROPERTY CARTEL HARMS CONSUMERS AND HOW CONSUMERS CAN PROTECT THEMSELVES (June 2006), readily available at http://www.
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pdf. 294. Id. at 4-5. 295. See, e. g., Lewis, Tr. at 178-79; Sambrotto, Tr. at 114; Farmer, Tr. at 115. 296. Whatley, Tr. at 45-46. 297. See Katherine A. Pancak et al., Property Agency Reform: Fulfilling the Requirements of Buyers, Sellers, and Brokers, 25 REALTY L.J. 345, 350 (1997) (keeping in mind that firm relationships can be created by actions).
Whatley, Tr. at 48. 299. Preventing fee-for-service listings without disclosure to purchasers, nevertheless, might raise concerns concerning the satisfaction of fiduciary duties. 300. See supra Chapter I.B. 1. 301. Blanche Evans, Where Real Estate Associations Stand On MLS-Entry-Only Listings, REAL ESTATE TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005, offered at http://realtytimes. com/rtapages/20050224 _ mlsentryonly. htm. 302. OHIO CODE 4735.
18 of the Modified Code and negotiations performed by a licensee pursuant to the authorization renting out your timeshare shall not develop or indicate an agency relationship between that licensee and the client of that special broker."). 303. VA CODE 54. 1-2132( C) (efficient July 1, 2007) (" A licensee engaged by a seller in a genuine estate transaction may, unless prohibited by law or the brokerage relationship, offer support to a purchaser or possible purchaser by carrying out ministerial acts.
304. WIS. CODE 452. 133 (6). 305. Sambrotto, Tr. at 90. 306. ForSaleByOwner. com Corp. v. Zinnemann, 347 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 307. Id. at 879. 308. United States v. Realty Multi-List, 629 F. 2d 1351, 1374 (5th all i needed was the last thing i wanted Cir. 1980) (" [W] hen broker participation in the [MLS] is high, the service itself is economically successful and competitors from other listing services is doing not have, guidelines which invite the unjustified exclusion of any broker should be discovered unreasonable.").
See, e. g., Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F. 2d 1566, 1579-80 (11th Cir. 1991); Austin Bd. of Realtors v. E-Realty, Inc., No. Civ. A-00-CA- 154 JN, 2000 WL 34239114, at * 4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2000). A discussion of the various private lawsuits involving alleged MLS-related restraints is beyond the scope of this Report.
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For a discussion of special firm contracts and other kinds of noting arrangements, see supra Chapter I.A. 2. 310. See Farmer, Tr. at 74-75; Sambrotto, Tr. at 90. 311. NAR 2005 SURVEY, supra note 38, at 29-30. 312. Austin Bd. of Realtors, FTC Dkt. No. C-4167; Information and Genuine Estate Solutions, LLC, FTC File No.
051-0065; Williamsburg Area Ass 'n of Realtors, Inc., FTC File No. 061-0268; Realtors Ass 'n of Northeast Wisconsin, Inc., FTC File No. 061-0267; Monmouth County Ass 'n of Realtors, Inc., FTC File No. 051-0217. 313. See, e. g., Info and Genuine Estate Providers, LLC, FTC File No (what is escheat in real estate). 061-0087, at 6 (2006) (analysis to aid public remark), available at westlake financial houston tx http://www.
pdf. 314. See, e. g., Austin Bd. of Realtors, FTC Dkt. No. C-4167, at 17 (2006) (grievance), available at http://www. ftc.gov/ os/caselist/0510219/ 0510219AustinBoardofRealtorsComplaint. pdf. 315. Id. at 27. 316. See MiRealSource, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 9321 (2007) (decision and order), available at http://www. ftc.gov/ os/adjpro/d9321/ 070323decisionorder. pdf. 317. See, e. g., United Realty Brokers of Rockland, Ltd., Dkt.